Philipp Bagus’s The Tragedy of the Euro begins as Bagus’s explanation of the European integration project in the wake of the Second World War. Bagus explains that Germany, bereft of the ability to dominate militarily, rapidly expanded industry and its economy grew dramatically. The Bundesbank of Germany became the leading financial institution of Europe and was both feared and disdained by most of Western Europe for its abhorrence of inflation and immense power. The economic growth of post war West Germany made the deutschmark the currency of choice for investment and the driver of exchange rates. Bagus argues that France, Britain, and other nations forced Germany to abandon the sovereignty of its national currency in order to accept German reunification. As the European Monetary Union (EMU) and European Central Bank (ECB) developed, Germany’s economic strength helped incentivize investment and large government deficits in “Latin” countries. This providing of prestige, investor confidence, and bond purchases (indirectly) by the ECB acted as transfer payments from the strong Northern European countries to the less efficient Southern European countries. The situation represented a mixture of moral hazard and a tragedy of the commons, whereby the common currency was abused by less productive countries at the expense of more productive countries, laying the foundation for a sovereign debt crisis. Throughout the entire book, Bagus returns to his constant narrative that the collective European project is one that is bereft of democracy, undermines property rights, and is not as stable as the gold standard or non-fraction banking.
I take great umbrage with Bagus’s explanation of the European project, the ECB, the Euro, and the future of the Euro. Bagus is fixated on the perfection of the gold standard and adamantly against fractional banking. The gold standard is prone to unexpected inflation, high transaction costs, and a limited economy. In a similar vein, non-fractional banking has a high burden of transactions and does not allow for the potential of the economy to be actualized. Bagus also makes the bold claim that bankers, central banks, and governments are in cahoots to maximize profits through collusion and exploitation of the ordinary, working class citizen. While it might be the case that central banks buy government debt, monetization of that debt would lead to investor flight from government bonds and a vicious downward spiral.
Yes, a common currency allowed for Southern European economies, governments, and citizens to spend outside of their means and accumulate debt that caused the sovereign debt crisis. But, this was also caused by the European collective willingness to not adhere to strong standards for entrance into the Euro and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Additionally, investors chose to lend the money to Greece in the form of bonds to permit this deficit spending. Furthermore, Germany’s strong, export-led growth was facilitated by a currency that was undervalued for the strength and size of the German economy. The Euro was of a lower value than the deutschmark would have been, making German exports outside of the Eurozone cheaper than they would have been otherwise. To add greater sin to the “victim” of the Euro project, German banks were heavily invested in the debt of Greece, turning a profit at the same time that Greeks could then buy more German goods (similar to the U.S.-China relationship). A simple story of Germany constantly being forced to capitulate to French and Southern European desires at the expense of its economic potential is both overstated and lacking evidence.
The Eurozone is in trouble and still reeling from crisis. Inflation rates are incredibly low and risk the spectre of deflation. Investment in the Eurozone and overall growth are incredibly low. Bagus does have one very sound and strong point: the Euro would be stronger and more sound with a stronger political union. So long as states do not have to adhere to strong budgetary policies that regulate debt and promote economic growth, the Euro will feel strains in opposite directions and risk tearing. A United States of Europe would harmonize fiscal and monetary policies, strengthen the Euro, increase investor confidence, and pave the way for a Euro that will last. Unfortunately, nationalism and eurosceptisim are present across the Eurozone. The sovereign debt crisis forced some budget and fiscal harmonization and will mend some of the fractures of the crisis and years that led up to the problems. But, a stronger political union (than the EU) is still a long way off and may require more crises before ample political impetus is in place to see it actualize.